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RECENT CASES
six miles per hour speed limit 22 could impose unreasonable civil
liability. As it has been aptly stated, "Draconian application of the
doctrine of negligence per se will occasionally result in a finding that
a defendant who was careful in fact was negligent in law."2 3 Another
reason for allowing excused violations is that a blind application of
the negligence per se rule may result in liability without fault. There
are "cases in which the defendant is not deserving of admonition, nor
in a better position to bear or distribute the loss than the plaintiff."2 4
The principal case establishes that a supplier of electricity must
use the highest degree of care in doing so, and that one who violates
an ordinance may be excused of civil liability depending upon the
safety, practicability, or effectiveness of complying with its terms. The
latter represents an excellent development in the law of negligence per
se because (1) the cause of the injury may be outside the control of
the violator, (2) the violator may be acting reasonably under the cir-
cumstances, (3) the legislation may not be such as to impose a
universally obligatory rule of conduct, (4) the amount of unreasonable
legislation in existence, (5) a strict application of the negligence per
se rule may result in .liability without fault.
WAYNE J. CA~mOLL
WLLs-INvAIDrrY OF ENT=e WIL WBME A PORTION VIOLATES TI
RuLE AGAmIsT PERPETurnEs-LAcEs-In 1930 testatrix devised her real
estate to her four children for life, remainder to her surviving grand-
children for life, remainder in fee to her great-grandchildren. The
possessory life tenants were given expressly the power to sell the land
in fee provided the proceeds were reinvested in other land and the title
to the new land taken in strict accordance with the terms of the will.
Each of the children exercised the power of sale and in a single deed
conveyed to their father in fee the land devised in the will. He in turn
executed a separate deed of reinvestment and partition back to each
of the children. These deeds from the father to the children included
not only the land devised by the testatrix to the children, but also all
of the land which the father owned in his own name. In other words,
each child received a separate tract of the family lands by way of
reinvestment. The deed to the appellee reserved a life estate in tho
father, and then created a remainder for life in appellee, with the
L. & N. R.R. Co. v. Dalton, 102 Ky. 290, 43 S.W. 431 (1897).
Moiuus, TORTS 65 (1958).
Morris, The Relation of Criminal Statutes to Civil Liability, 46 HAav. L.
REv. 453 at 458 (1983).
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remainder in fee to appellees surviving children; and in the absence
of children, remainder in fee to appellee's heirs, who are the appellants
here. The validity of the will or the deed of reinvestment to appellee
was not questioned until 1958. Appellee, being sixty-seven years of
age and having no children, filed a declaratory judgment action to
have the entire will declared invalid as violating the rule against
perpetuities. He also requested the court to cancel the deed of rein-
vestment because it could not be made to comply with the provisions
of a void will, and to issue a new deed granting him a fee simple title
to the property. The circuit court granted the relief requested.
Reversed. Thomas v. Utterback, 268 S.W. 2d 251 (Ky. 1954).
The Kentucky Court of Appeals held that the action was, in sub-
stance, an action to reform a deed and therefore barred by laches.1
It also held that although the remainder in fee to the testatrix's great-
grandchildren was void as violating the rule against perpetuities,2
the preceding life estates were valid. 3
The court relied on two earlier Kentucky decisions in upholding
the validity of the life estates under the will.4 In Chenoweth v. Bul-
litt5 the court directly decided that successive life interests were not
void because the ultimate remainder violated the rule against per-
petuities. The court said that on principle there would seem to be no
reason why the invalidity of the ultimate or pre-ultimate limitations
should affect an antecedent estate which is good in itself.6 In the in-
stant case the court again rejected the so-called doctrine of "infectious
invalidity"7 and reaffirmed the rule that, where a remainder provision
in a will violates the rule against perpetuities, it is stricken out, and the
:Thomas v. Utterback, 269 S.W. 2d 251 (Ky. 1954). Although the action
was brought as a declaratory judgment, the court, in effect, interpreted the action
to be one for the reformation of the deed of reinvestment, and therefore, the
doctrine of laches would bar the action. The court avoided the question as to
whether the equitable defense of laches would be available to bar a declaratoryjudgment which is a statutory action. If the court had interpreted the action
as being a declaratory judgment, it might well be argued that it could have denied
relief under "all the circumstances." Ky. BEv. STAT. sec. 418.065 (1954). There
is some authority to the effect that laches might be invoked to bar a declaratoryjudgment. See Baxter v. Pace, 193 F. 2d 20 (1951); Gordon Johnson Company
v. Hunt, 102 F. Supp. 1008 (1952).
'Ky. REv. STAT. see. 881.220 (1954) states: "The absolute power of aliena-
tion shall not be suspended, by any limitation or condition whatever, for a longer
period than during the continuance of a life or lives in being at the creation of
the estate, and twenty-one years and ten months thereafter." (Although this sec-
tion is usually cited as stating the Kentucky rule against perpetuities, it has fre-
quently been construed to be merely declaratory of the common law rule against
perpetuities.) ' Supra note 1.
'Ford v. Yost, 800 Ky. 764, 190 S.W. 2d 21 (1945); Chenoweth v. Bullitt,
224 Ky. 698, 6 S.W. 2d 1061 (1928).
' Supra note 4. - Id. at 716, 6 S.W. 2d at 1064.
'See 6 AM-mEcAN LAw OF PRoPaERT sec. 24.48 (1952).
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other interests created in the will take effect as if the void provision
had never been written.
A refinement to this rule was recognized in Ford v. Yost8 where
the court adopted the statement of the principle contained in AM=x-
cAN JumSPRuDENCE 9 to the general effect that the entire devise will fail
only if the invalid limitation is so essential to the dispositive scheme
of the testator that it can be inferred that he would not wish the prior
estates to stand alone.
The court reaffirmed this position in the present case, and in
applying its test reached the conclusion that the remainder in fee to
the great-grandchildren was not so interwoven with the preceding
life estates as to invalidate the entire devise. Therefore, the life
estates would take effect as if the ultimate remainder had not been
written into the will.10 It necessarily follows from the conclusion of
the court that the fee ownership of testatrix's property passed by
intestacy to the heirs in the form of a reversion. Since the children
were also her heirs, it would seem that appellee, as an heir, took a life
interest under the will and an undivided one-fourth interest in fee.
The subsequent effect of appellee's deed to his father and the
father's reinvestment to him is not decided in the case since the court
held that appellees attempt to raise the issue was barred by laches.
The court said that he had acquiesced in a construction of the will by
accepting and relying on the deed for a period of twenty-two years,
and he could not now repudiate what has turned out to be a bad
agreement.'"
The court stated that, although delay alone without injury is not
enough to uphold the plan of laches, there was sufficient injury in the
present case. It expressly relied on the fact that some of the parties
affected by the agreement had died, and therefore the rights of their
heirs would be affected by the delay as they had the right to rely
upon the validity of the deed which was executed in 1931.12
In legal significance, laches is not mere delay, but is unreasonable.
8 Supra note 4.
"41 Am. Jun. 100 (1942) states: "The test is whether the invalid parts are
so interwoven with those which are valid that the former may not be eliminated
without interfering with or changing in any essential the main testamentary
scheme. This can usually be done when it is clear that the gifts which do not
transgress the rule are so independent that it is manifest that the testator would
have desired they should stand if he had been aware of the invalidity of the
rest.
"The opinion of the case, like most cases, is not very specific in suggesting
as to how the test should be applied. The court merely seems to have read the
will as a whole and concluded that the testatrix's dispositive scheme could take
effect even though the ultimate remainder was void.
' Supra note 3, at 252. 12 Ibid.
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delay that works an injury or disadvantage to another.13 What is
unreasonable delay depends upon the facts of the particular case, and
so long as the parties are in the same position, it is of little significance
whether one pressed a right promptly or slowly.14
One element necessary to constitute the equitable defense of
laches seems to be totally lacking in the present case-a detrimental
change in position on the part of the parties to this action due to the
delay in the bringing of the action.
The court by the use of the doctrine of laches refused, in effect,
to determine the subsequent effect of the deed of reinvestment. A
careful analysis of the nature of the interest created by the deed fails
to show how the parties to the present action had changed their posi-
tion during the lapsed period of time or afrmatively relied upon the
ownership of the future interest they received under the deed of
reinvestment.15
Normally one would expect reliance or change of, position to occur
only if the potential heirs had attempted to sell or mortgage, or in
some other way had shown that they were aware they owned a
future interest. Therefore, the bringing of the present action would
cause them irreparable injury after they had relied on the ownership
of the interest in changing their position.
To support its finding of a material change of position in the
present case, the court referred to the fact that some of the parties had
died prior to the institution of the suit. Therefore, their heirs would
be prejudiced by the bringing of the action. The court also relied on
the fact that the parties had no doubt entered into numerous business
ventures upon the strength of the title to the property being unques-
tioned. It is unclear from an examination of the opinion and of the
record, whether the parties referred to by the court in the present
action were the-heirs of the testatrix, of the appellants, or of the ap-
pellee. Only the rights of the potential heirs of the appellee would
seem to be involved in this action.
The court may have failed to distinguish carefully between laches
and estoppel by acquiscence or estoppel by acceptance of benefits
under a will. Although the court spoke in terms of laches, it seemed
'Kendall v. Mussman, 247 S.W. 2d 502 (Ky. 1952).
' Starck v. Foley, 290 Ky. 332, 272 S.W. 890 (1925).
' The deed of reinvestment reserved a life estate in appellee's father, and
then created a remainder for life in the appellee, with the remainder in fee to the
appellee's surviving children, and in the absence of children, remainder in fee to
appellee's heirs. Since the parties to the present action are also the appellee's
heirs, they received a contingent future interest in the remainder in fee under the
deed of reinvestment.
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to cite only terms of acquiescence. If this is properly a case involving
the doctrine of estoppel by acquiescence, the Kentucky Court of Ap-
peals has not literally applied the doctrine.'6 Since there was so little
evidence of change of position or injury on the part of appellants prior
to the commencement of the action here, if the doctrine of laches ap-
plies, it must be because of the assumption that the owner of a future
interest relies on it so as to materially change his position, although
he does no more than own it. This application of the doctrine is at
least quite reasonable. JAMms LEviN
AGENCY-IMPUTED NEGLIGENCE-USE oF DUTY-DEscRn'nON CIRCULAR
To Lmirr GOvER-MENTAL LIABILITY UNmDE FEimxiAL TORT CLunvs Act
-Plaintiff, as administrator of the estates of his deceased parents, G. C.
Watt and Nennie McDougal Watt, brought an action against the
United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act of 1946.1 Plaintiff's
parents were killed in a collision between the Watt car, owned by Mrs.
Watt and driven by Mr. Watt, and a truck assigned to Company 'T',
153rd Infantry, Arkansas National Guard. The truck was being driven
by Sergeant First Class Jerry G. Reedy, unit administrator of Company
"I". Sergeant Reedy was accompanied on the trip by Sergeant First
Class Reuben F. Taylor, unit caretaker for Company 'T'. Sergeant
Reedy and Sergeant Taylor were returning from a trip which had
begun at the unit headquarters at the armory in Jonesboro, Arkansas
and had taken them to Little Rock, Arkansas. They were ordered
upon the trip by the Adjutant General of the State of Arkansas for the
purpose of turning in clothing and drawing other supplies and equip-
ment for their unit.2 Plaintiff alleged that Sergeant Reedy was negli-
" See Ford v. Yost, supra note 4; 19 Am. JuR. 682 (1942).
'28 U.S.C.A. see. 1346 (b) provides: "Subject to the provisions of chapter
171 of this title, the district courts . . . shall have exclusive jurisdiction of civil
actions on claims against the United States, for money damages . . . for . . . per-
sonal injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any
employee of the Government while acting within the scope of his office or em-
ployment, under circumstances where the United States, if a private person, would
be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the act
or omission occurred."
- Special Order No. 35.
"Tar. 5. VO [verbal order] the Adjutant General of Arkansas dtd. 18 Feb.
1958 issued...
"Dated 1 Oct. 1952 the following personnel... WP [will proceed] to Camp
Robinson, Ark. o/a [on or about] 19 Feb. 1953 by NG veh [National Guard
vehicle] for aprx one (1) day, purp of turning in and drawing supplies and
equipment for Unit:
"SFC Jerry G. Reedy, 14235994, Unit Administrative assistant, SFC Reuben
F. Taylor, 25418988, Unit Caretaker
"UponcompI [completion] of TD [temporary duty] will ret [return] to proper
sta....
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gent, that his negligence was the proximate cause of the accident, and
that Sergeant Reedy was a federal employee acting within the scope
of his employment. Defendant denied the allegations of the plaintiff
and, further, contended that Mr. Watt was contributorily negligent
and that such negligence on the part of Mr. Watt is imputed to Mrs.
Watt, thus barring any recovery for her death. Held: Judgment for
defendant. The truck driver, Sergeant Reedy, was a federal employee,
but was not acting within the scope of his employment in driving the
truck. The plaintiff's father was acting as his mother's agent in driving
the automobile, and the contributory negligence of the father was
imputable to the mother under the doctrine of respondeat superior.
Watt v. United States, 123 Fed. Supp. 906 (E.D. Ark. 1954).
The result in this case was undoubtedly correct in view of the
court's application of (1) the almost universal rule that contributory
negligence will bar recovery for injuries suffered as a result of ordinary
negligence,3 and (2) the imputation of Mr. Watts contributory negli-
gence to Mrs. Watt under the doctrine of respondeat superior.4 The
court following the rules adopted by Arkansas, rejected the family
purpose doctrine5 and the doctrine of imputing the negligence of the
driver to the mere passenger of a car,6 but felt that the combination
of the facts showing that Mrs. Watt was the owner and was present
in the car and that the Watts were on Mrs. Watt's business was
enough to establish a master-servant relationship and render Mr.
Watt's negligence attributable to Mrs. Watt. While it appears that
courts are not willing to find an agency relationship based on a single
factor such as the marital relationship,7 the wife's presence,s the wife's
ownership and right of control,9 or the fact that the wife's business
was being furthered, 10 the court was justified in allowing a combina-
tion of these factors to establish the agency relationship necessary
under the accepted doctrine of the jurisdiction, that of respondeat
superior.
Attention should be given, however, to the court's holding that
Sergeant Reedy was not acting within the scope of his employment
888 Am. Jum. 848 (1941).
4Johnson v. Newman, 168 Ark. 836, 271 S.W. 705 (1925); Wisconsin &
Arkansas Lumber Co. v. Brady,. 157 Ark. 449, 248 S.W. 278 (1923); Standard Oil
of Ky. v. Thompson, 189 Ky. 830, 226 S.W. 368 (1920).
8See Norton v. HaUl, 149 Ark. 428, 232 S.W. 934 (1921).
'See Itzkowitz v. P. H. Reubel & Co., 158 Ark. 454, 250 S.W. 535 (1923);
Carter v. Brown, 136 Ark. 23, 206 S.W. 71 (1918); Hot Springs St. Ry. Co. v.
Hildreth, 72 Ark. 572, 82 S.W. 245 (1904).
Rodgers v. Saxton, 305 Pa. 479, 158 A. 166 (1931).
'Ibid; Poteet v. Kitler, 196 Ark. 1078, 121 S.W. 2d 114 (1938); 12 A.L.R.
1459, 1463 (1921). '4 Am. JuR. 703 (1936).
" Lockart v. Ross, 191 Ark. 743, 87 S.W. 2d 73 (1935).
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at the time of the accident. The court in finding as a matter of law
that Sergeant Reedy was a federal employee followed a very small
minority represented by two cases decided by the Fifth Circuit Court
of Appeals" and one Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals case.12 In so
doing, the court opposes a large majority of cases holding that a
National Guardsman is not a federal employee.' 3 The court's determi-
nation, in this respect, was perhaps justified, but, considering the facts
of the case, it is difficult to see how it could then find that he was not
within the scope of his employment. The court appears to have
determined Sergeant Reedy's scope of employment almost solely on
the basis of a National Guard Circular which set forth the duties of a
unit administrator. 14 The various duties which Sergeant Reedy, as
unit administrator, was required to perform were, for the most part,
of a clerical nature, according to the memorandum, but they also
included the general responsibility regarding the maintenance and
storage of unit supplies and property. It is true that the memorandum
went into considerable detail outlining the duties of unit administrator,
and it is equally true that the unit administrator was not specifically
delegated the duty of driving a truck, but it just as true that the
memorandum did not prohibit the driving of trucks by unit administra-
tors. The court apparently concluded that since the memorandum was
detailed and did not include the driving of trucks as one of the duties
of unit administrator, any unit administrator who drove a truck would
be outside his scope of employment. The facts show that Sergeant
Reedy was ordered to make the trip by the Adjutant General of
Arkansas'15 and was on military business only. In the face of these
facts, the court merely says, "It does not appear that the performance
of any duties entrusted to Sergeant Reedy necessitated his going to
Little Rock on the occasion in question; on the other hand, it seems
the purpose of his going was, at least primarily, simply to lighten
Sergeant Taylor's task by relieving him from time to time at the wheel
of the truck."16 It would seem that the order from the Adjutant Gen-
eral of the State of Arkansas should merit more consideration in
determining Sergeant Reedy's purpose or reason for making the trip
that occasioned the accident.
'U.S. v. Duncan, 197 F. 2d 233 (5th Cir. 1952); Elmo v. U.S., 197 F. 2d
230 (5th Cir. 1952). " U.S. v. Holly, 192 F. 2d 221 (10th Cir. 1951).
" Satcher v. U.S., 101 F. Supp. 919 (W.D. So. Car. 1952); U.S. ex rel
Gillett v. Dern, 74 F. 2d 485 (D.C. Cir. 1934); Griffith v. National Guard, 212 P.
2d 403 (Ida. 1949); Commonwealth v. Sparks, 201 Ky. 5, 255 S.W. 859 (1923);
People v. Hill, 126 N.Y. 497, 27 N.E. 789 (1891).
National Guard Bureau Circular No. 4, 23 Jan. 1950, Par. 3 (b) 2.
Supra note 2.
" Watt v. U.S., 123 Fed. Supp. 906, 914 (E.D. Ark. 1954).
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In the absence of evidence to show that Sergeant Reedy knew of
the provisions of the National Guard Circular,17 the court's conclusion
that Sergeant Reedy's duties did not include his going to Little Rock
is questionable. A soldier's duties, in the absence of superior orders
to the contrary, are those assigned to him by his immediate superiors.
Recognizing that the circular or memorandum setting out Sergeant
Reedy's duties as unit administrator came from higher authority than
the Adjutant General of Arkansas, and conceding the possibility that
Sergeant Reedy might interpret the order as prohibiting his driving a
truck, in the absence of proof that Sergeant Reedy actually knew of
the circular and its prohibitions, it is at least logical to conclude that
Sergeant Reedy was within the scope of his employment in following
the orders of a superior whose orders he was bound to obey.18
Much controversy has arisen with regard to the interpretation of
the Federal Tort Claims Act as to what situations are actionable under
its provisions. The difficulty stems from dogged adherence to the
common law doctrine of strict construction of a waiver of sovereign
immunity.'0 The court in the instant case quoted principles stated in
the opinion in Cannon v. United States,20 thus indicating its con-
servative position in the split of authority on the interpretation of the
Federal Tort Claims Act. Other courts have refused to apply "a nig-
gardly construction based on formal rules made obsolete by the very
purpose of the Act itself."21 A recent case decided by the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals held that a Border Patrol Inspector was within the
scope of his employment under the Federal Tort Claims Act in firing
his pistol at dogs who were annoying him while he was making out a
report.22 O'Connell et ux. v. United States23 held that an army private
who had been ordered by his sergeant never to drive an army vehicle
was within the scope of employment when he drove a vehicle upon
orders of a corporal. A recent sixth circuit case held that the United
States was not liable for the negligence of a soldier who drove an army
vehicle off the military reservation at Ft. Knox for the purpose of pur-
chasing whiskey. The court based its decision on the fact that the
' Supra note 14.
"PoLLocx, Trm LA-w oF TouTs 87 (12th Ed. 1923).
"Still less will the servant cease to be about his master's business if he is
acting by the order of a superior fellow-servant whom he is generally bound to
obey, and that order is in fact though not to his knowledge unauthorized.'
"Note, 4 Wyo. L.J. 96, at 102 (1949).
' Cannon v. U.S., 84 F. Supp. 820 (N.D. Cal. 1949).
Spelar v. U.S., 171 F. 2d 208, 209 (2d Cir. 1948), reversed 70 Sup. Ct. 10
(1949).
2U.S. v. Stewart, 201 F. 2d 135 (5th Cir. 1953).
110 F. Supp. 612 (E.D. Wash. 1953).
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soldier's act was contrary to orders and his mission was not one "with
which the United States was in any wise connected or interested,"2 4
indicating that if he had been on government business, even contrary
to orders, it might well have applied the doctrine used by so many
courts-that the true test of the master's liability is whether or not the
servant was on the master's business at the time of the negligent act.
2 5
If a federal employee is within the scope of his employment in firing
a gun at annoying dogs and a private is within the scope of his
employment in driving a truck in express disobedience of an order
from a superior, it certainly seems logical that when a federal em-
ployee operates a vehicle furnished him by his employer, on his
employer's business at the direct order of a person delegated by his
employer to give such orders, such operation should also be within
the scope of his employment for purposes of the Federal Tort Claims
Act.
The apparent tendency of the court in the case at hand to cling
to habits formed through many years of sovereign immunity is by no
means unique. The same tendency has been reflected in other juris-
dictions.20 In opposition to this strict interpretation, however, there
is considerable authority advocating a liberal construction and in-
terpretation of the Federal Tort Claims Act.2 7 It is believed that the
present trend is toward liberal construction.2 8
Another aspect of this case which should be noted is that Sergeant
Taylor,2 9 the authorized driver of the vehicle, was sitting beside
Sergeant Reedy when the accident occurred. Conceding, for the
moment, that Sergeant Reedy was not within the scope of employ-
ment, it is submitted that his negligence could very easily have been
imputed to the Government. It is a settled principle of law that a
' Greenwood v. U.S., 97 F. Supp. 996, 999 (W.D. Ky. 1951).
'Pacific Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. White, 104 F. 2d 923 (9th Cir.
1939). Nelson v. American-West African Line, 86 F. 2d 730 (2d Cir. 1936), cert.
denied 300 U.S. 665 (1937). Meldram v. Curtis & Bro., 29 F. 2d 582 (E.D. Pa.
1928); U.S. Steel Co. v. Butler, 69 So. 2d 685 (1953).
'In re Texas City Disaster Litigation, 197 F. 2d 771 (5th Cir. 1952), aff'd.
346 U.S. 15 (1953); Jones v. U.S., 89 F. Supp. 980 (S.D. Iowa 1949); Cannon
vU.S., 84 F. Supp. 820 (N.D. Cal. 1949); Franzino v. U.S., 83 F. Supp. 10(D. New Jersey 1949); U.S. v. Chicago, R.I. & P. Ry. Co., 171 F. 2d 377 (10th
Cir. 1948).
" O'Toole v. U.S., 206 F. 2d 912 (3rd Cir. 1953); Rushford v. U.S., 92 F.
Supp. 874 (N.D.N.Y. 1950), aff'd 204 F. 2d 831 (2d Cir. 1953); Mid-Central
Fish Co. v. U.S., 112 F. Supp. 792 (W.D. Mo. 1953); Somerset Seafood Co. v.
U.S., 193 F. 2d 631 (4th Cir. 1951); Old Colony Ins. Co. v. U.S., 168 F. 2d 931
(6th Cir. 1948). u Supra note 19 at 102.
It was undisputed that Sergeant Taylor's duties as unit caretaker included
the driving of vehicles, and if Sergeant Reedy is a federal employee, it necessarily
follows that Sergeant Taylor must also be a federal employee. Supra notes 11 and
12.
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master is liable for the negligence of an unauthorized driver, driving
with the permission and in the presence of the authorized driver3
This theory is so well established in the law that it is surprising that
it was neither raised by counsel nor considered by the court. The
negligence is imputed to the master under this theory in one of two
ways: (1) through the authorized servant's negligence in failing to
supervise and control the person driving if he is present in the vehicle
when the accident occurs; 3' or (2) through the authorized servant's
negligence in allowing an incompetent person to drive.32 The fact
that the master expressly forbids the servant to allow another to drive
will not relieve the master of liability in most jurisdictions.33 A case
directly in point applied this doctrine under the Federal Tort Claims
Act and held the United States liable for the negligence of an un-
authorized driver of a navy jeep who had been allowed to operate the
vehicle in the presence of the authorized driver.34 While there is
no evidence that Sergeant Reedy was incompetent to drive the truck,
there is little doubt from the facts of the case that Sergeant Taylor
was negligent in supervising and controlling the vehicle. Thus
Sergeant Reedy's negligence could be imputed to the United States
under the doctrine just discussed.
As stated previously, the final result in this case is undoubtedly
correct. By far the most disturbing aspect of the case is the court's
use of the circular as the basis of its holding that Sergeant Reedy was
not within the scope of employment. If this reasoning is followed,
any individual or corporation might be able to limit its liability simply
by setting out the duties of servants in the form of a written memo-
randum and thus escape liability for any act not specifically authorized
which results in injury to another by one of its servants. The law
has not allowed private individuals or corporations to so limit their
liability in the past, and it is submitted that to allow the Government
MEcHiEm, OuTLms OF AGENCY 256 (4th Ed. 1952). ". . . a very large
porportion of current litigation over course of employment involves the driving of
automobiles by servants. Three problems have been especially conspicuous. The
first concerns the servant who lets a friend drive for him. ". . . the case is
usually treated as a separate one and in a large number of cases the master has
been held liable on one theory or another. Only a sprinkling of cases hold the
contrary."
' Turoff v. Burch, 50 F. 2d 986 (D.C. Cir. 1931); Keen v. Clarkson, 108 P.
2d 573 (Ariz. 1940); Jones v. Lozier, 195 Iowa 365, 191 N.W. 103 (1922); Thix-
ton v. Palmer, 210 Ky. 838, 276 S.W. 971 (1925); Geiss v. Twin City Taxicab Co.,
120 Minn. 368, 139 N.W. 611 (1913); Blumenfeld v. Meyer-Schmid Grocer Co.,
206 Mo. App. 509, 320 S.W. 132 (1921).
' Potter v. Golden Rule Grocery Co., 169 Tenn. 240, 84 S.W. 2d 364 (1935).
' 5 Am. JuR. 721 (1936).
' Siciliana v. U.S., 85 F. Supp. 726 (D. New Jersey 1949).
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to do so would result in an untenable situation and one that would
be contrary to the intention of Congress in waiving sovereign im-
munity. To allow the Government to determine the scope of the em-
ployment of its agents by written memoranda would cause many
actions under the Federal Tort Claims Act to depend upon the court's
interpretation of government correspondence. Such a result would be
opposed to the injured individual's right of recovery for harm done to
him through no fault of his own and thus opposed to the function of
tort law as it is recognized in its relationship to well established prin-
ciples of agency.
CHARTXs CAIX
CovE Nrs-WHEN A CHANGE OF CoNDnIoNs MAY RENDE A REsI-
DENTrAL REsnucroN UENFocEABLE-The plaintiffs, husband and
wife, purchased two lots in a subdivision, which were subject to cer-
tain restrictive covenants stating that they were to be used for
residential purposes only. The plaintiffs brought an action in equity
to have these residential restrictions adjudged unenforceable, alleging
that conditions in the neighborhood had changed so as to defeat the
purpose of the covenants. Commercial buildings had been built
across the street from the subdivision, and the plaintiffs' two lots had
been zoned "Commercial" by the City Zoning Commission. However,
the chancellor sustained a demurrer to the plaintiffs' petition, finding
that conditions had not changed within the subdivision itself so as to
defeat the purpose of the restriction, and that the action of the zoning
commission did not nullify the convenant. Held: Affumed. None of
the other lot owners within the Subdivision had waived or abandoned
the covenant, and while the action of the zoning commission indicated
a substantial change in the general area from residential to com-
mercial purposes, it did not have the force of destroying the restrictive
covenants. Changes must occur and be acquiesced in by the owners
of other lots within the subdivision, thus rendering the changes
permanent and materially defeating the purpose of the covenant,
before equity will declare the restriction unenforceable. Franklin v.
Moats 273 S.W. 2d 812 (Ky. 1954).
The situation presented in this case is one of ever-increasing im-
portance. The swift expansion of urban districts within the past fifty
years, especially the expansion of business and industry into suburban
areas, has created a conflict between the interests of homeowners in
preserving the residential character of the area and the interests of
